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Abstract
This paper, using a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work, considers how a small open EMU accession country should
choose its Euro conversion rate. In this model a monetary union is
interpreted as a perfectly credible infinite nominal exchange rate peg,
and an algorithm is provided which maps the vector of accession date
values of the state and the exogenous variables to a certain size of
nominal exchange rate devaluation or revaluation. It is shown that it
is not enough to base the decision on exclusively one factor, namely,
the real exchange rate misalignment, although this has a primary role
in the determination of the optimal conversion rate. Beyond the real
exchange rate, the inflation rate, the real and the nominal wage level,
the state of the foreign business cycle, as well as foreign price levels
and productivity are the most important additional factors necessary
for finding the optimal solution.
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1 Introduction
At the beginning of May, 2004, ten countries joined the European Union.
It is obligatory for the new member countries to join the Monetary Union,
although the deadline for this is not yet specified. Joining the Monetary
Union raises several complicated questions of economic policy: policy makers
have to decide how and when to meet the Maastricht criteria, they should
decide about the date of entering the ERM II exchange rate arrangement,
as well as about the corresponding central parity, about the date of joining
the Monetary Union, and last but not least, about the Euro conversion rate.
This paper aims to contribute to the solution of this last-mentioned problem.
So far, academic literature has not paid attention to this problem. Non-
academic economic policy literature focuses almost exclusively on one factor,
namely the misalignment of the real exchange rate, namely its deviation from
an estimated equilibrium real exchange rate.1 Moreover, it has not provided
enough guidelines about how to use the misalignment indices for the deter-
mination of the optimal conversion rate. It is not sufficient to base such an
important decision on the intuitive wisdom that an overvalued (undervalued)
real exchange rate should imply a devaluation (revaluation) of the nominal
exchange rate.
This paper performs a welfare analysis of the problem. The Monetary
Union is modelled as an infinitely long, perfectly credible exchange rate peg,
and a new open economy macroeconomics model is used to provide an algo-
rithm to determine how to peg the nominal exchange rate optimally if the
accession date values of state and exogenous variables are known.
It is shown that beyond an appropriately defined misalignment index the
past inflation rate and the level of real wages are important state variables
worthwhile to take into consideration for the settlement of the conversion
rate. Furthermore, the foreign-business-cycle, foreign-price, nominal-wage
and productivity shocks are the most important exogenous factors necessary
for a proper policy decision.
This study demonstrates the importance of a utility-based approach and
that evaluations based on ad-hoc welfare criteria may lead to misleading
results. It is shown that the persistence of the inflation process implies that
the optimal reaction to a positive past inflation rate is the devaluation of
the nominal exchange rate. This surprising result is the consequence of the
form of the exact social welfare function one can derive from the model:
what matters is not the inflation rate itself, but its quasi-difference if there is
1On different equilibrium real exchange rate concepts see the survey of MacDonald
(2000) and Driver and Westaway (2003).
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inflation indexation in the model. Furthermore, it is shown that the optimal
solution is sensitive to the persistency parameters of the inflation process.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 compares it with other models in the literature. In section 4 impulse
responses are analyzed and characteristics of the optimal conversion rate are
discussed. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2 The model
For the study of the determination of the optimal conversion rate one has to
take into account two important model building issues. On the one hand, the
model should be rich enough to capture important characteristics of real-life
economic policy problems. On the other hand, it should be simple enough
in order to be suitable for an exact welfare analysis.
Thus, instead of using a highly stylized environment the model is based
on a rich theoretical framework, and it features nominal and real rigidities,
such as sticky prices and wages complemented by implicit indexation, as well
as habit formation in consumption.
However, as Woodford (2003, ch. 6) shows, in general equilibrium models
some simplifying assumptions are required for the derivation of tractable
social welfare functions. Therefore, in this model some restrictions on the
relative movements of domestic consumption and exports are imposed, and
it is assumed that production inputs, imports and labor, are complements,
i.e. firms use Leontieff technology.
2.1 Households
The domestic economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived house-
holds. The expected utility function of household j is
∞∑
t=1
βt−1E1 [u(Ht(j))− v(lt(j))] , (1)
for all j ∈ [0, 1]. Ht(j) = ct(j) − hct−1(j), where ct(j), ct−1(j) denote the
consumption of household j at date t and t−1, parameter h ∈ [0, 1) measures
the strength of habit formation,2 and lt(j) is the labor supply of household
2The consumption habit is defined by past individual consumption and not by past
aggregate consumption. The reason is that if the consumption habit is related to aggregate
consumption, then there is an extra externality in the model, which would make the welfare
analysis of the paper more complicated.
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j. Furthermore u(H) = H1−σ/(1 − σ), and v(l) = l1+ϕ/(1 + ϕ), σ, ϕ > 0,
and 0 < β < 1.
The intertemporal budget constraint of a given household can be written
in the form
Ptct(j) + P
B
t Bt(j) = ζt(j)Bt−1(j) +
(
1− τWt
)
Wt(j)lt(j) + Tt(j), (2)
where Pt is the consumer price index, Bt(j) is the household’s nominal port-
folio at the beginning of time t, PBt is its price, ζt(j) is its stochastic payoff.
Wt(j) is the nominal wage paid to household j, τ
w
t represents labor market
taxes and transfers, and Tt(j) is a lump-sum tax/transfer levied/paid by the
government. Households supply differentiated labor, hence the wage paid to
individual households can be different. On the other hand, it is assumed
that the asset markets are complete, and it is possible to eliminate the risk
of heterogeneous labor supply and labor income.3 As a consequence, house-
holds have uniform income and consumption, i.e. ct(j)=ct, and they have
the same portfolio, i.e. Bt(j) = Bt, for all j and t.
The optimization problem of the households is the following: they maxi-
mize the objective function (1) subject to budget constraint (2), non-negativity
constraints on consumption, and no-Ponzi schemes. The assumption of com-
plete asset markets implies that the intertemporal allocation of consumption
is determined by the following condition in all states of the world:
β
Λt+1Pt
ΛtPt+1
= Dt,t+1, (3)
where Λt is the marginal utility of consumption,
Λt = (ct − hct−1)−σ − βhEt [ct+1 − hct]−σ , (4)
and Dt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor, which satisfies the condition
PBt = Et [Dt,t+1ζt] .
Since it is assumed that markets of international assets are also complete,
foreign equivalent of equation (3) is also held,
β
Λ∗t+1etP
F∗
t
Λ∗t et+1P F∗t+1
= Dt,t+1, (5)
where Λ∗t is the marginal utility of foreign households, P
F∗
t is the foreign con-
sumer price index in foreign currency terms, and et is the nominal exchange
3It is assumed that the government’s budget is balanced. The labor tax/transfer policy
represented by τwt is compensated by the non-distortive Tt lump-sum tax/transfer.
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rate. Combining equations (3) and (5), and applying recursive substitutions
gives:
Λtq
d
tP
F∗
t
Λ∗t
= ι, (6)
where ι is a constant, which depends on initial conditions, and
qdt =
et
pt
.
Since P F∗t q
d
t is the real exchange rate, q
d
t is called the domestic component of
the real exchange rate.
There is monopolistic competition in the labor market: As mentioned,
labor is differentiated, hence nominal wages can be different, and it is as-
sumed that Wt(j) is set by household j. This implies that the demand for
labor supplied by household j is given by
lt(j) =
(
Wt
Wt(j)
)θw
lt, (7)
where the aggregate wage index Wt is defined by
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
1−θw dj
) 1
1−θw
.
It is assumed that there is sticky wage setting in the model, as in the
paper of Erceg et al. (2000). Similarly to Calvo (1983), every individual
household at a given date changes its wage in a rational, optimizing forward-
looking manner with probability 1− γw. All those households, which do not
behave like this at the given date follow a rule of thumb, as in the models
of Christiano et al. (2001) and Smets and Wouters (2003), and they update
their wages according to the past inflation rate. Each household which sets its
price optimally takes into account the above mentioned characteristics of the
wage setting process, and the form of the labor demand function represented
by equation (7). Appendix B.2 shows that these conditions imply that wage
formation is determined by the following equation:
piwt − ϑwpit−1 = βEt
[
piwt+1 − ϑwpit
]
+ ξw [m˜rst − w˜t] + υ˜wt , (8)
where tilde denotes the percentage deviation of the variables from their
steady-state values, and
ξw =
(1− γw)(1− βγw)
γw(1 + ϕθw)
, (9)
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where piwt = W˜t−W˜t−1 is nominal wage inflation, pit = P˜t− P˜t−1, is CPI infla-
tion, ϑw ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of implicit indexation applied by those
who follow the rule of thumb, and the average marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labor is defined by
mrst = l
ϕ
t Λ
−1
t . (10)
The exogenous shock υ˜wt is given by υ˜
w
t = ξwµ˜
w
t +ε˜t = ξwτ
w (1− τw)−1 τ˜wt +ε˜t,
where τw is the steady state value of τ˜wt , and the interpretation of ε˜t is the
same as in footnote 14 of the paper of Clarida et al. (1999): this represents
some kind of systematic error in wage formation.
2.2 Production
Production has a hierarchical structure: at the first stage, import goods and
labor are transformed into differentiated intermediate goods, at the second
stage, a homogenous final good is produced by the differentiated goods.
Final good yt is produced in a competitive market by a constant-returns-
to-scale technology from a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods
yt(i), i ∈ [0, 1]. The technology is represented by the following CES produc-
tion function:
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
,
where θ > 1. As a consequence, price Pt is given by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θ di
) 1
1−θ
,
where Pt(i) denotes the prices of differentiated goods yt(i), and the demand
for yt(i) is determined by
yt(i) =
(
Pt
Pt(i)
)θ
yt. (11)
The continuum of goods yt(i) is produced in a monopolistically com-
petitive market. Each yt(i) is made by an individual firm, and they apply
the same technology. Firm i uses a decreasing-returns-to-scale technology, 4
4Decreasing returns to scale is not a common assumption in macroeconomics. But, as
is shown in Woodford (2003, ch. 5), provided the technology of the firms exhibits constant
returns to scale, physical capital is firm-specific, and the adjustment cost of investment is
high, then the presence of sticky prices implies that the firms’ behavior becomes similar
to the behavior induced by a decreasing-returns-to-scale technology without capital. In
addition, it can be assumed that capital is fixed and normalized 1. This can be justified
on the basis that at business cycle frequencies capital is uncorrelated with output.
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which is given by
yt(i) = Atzt(i)
1−α,
where 0 < α < 1, At is a uniform exogenous productivity factor of the
industry, and zt(i) denotes the firm i’s utilization of composite good zt,
zt(i) = min
[
a−1l lt(i), a
−1
m mt(i)
]
,
where lt(i) is the firm’s utilization of composite labor lt defined as
lt =
(∫ 1
0
lt(j)
θw−1
θw dj
) θw
θw−1
,
where θw > 1. mt(i) is the utilization of imported good mt, and al, am are
given parameters.5 The price of zt is determined by
W zt = alWt + ametP
m∗
t ,
where Pm∗t is the foreign currency price of the imported good.
The assumptions on the production process imply that yt(i)/At = z
1−α
t =
(lt(i)/al)
1−α = (mt(i)/am)1−α. Thus, the demand for labor and import of
firm i is determined by
lt(i)
1−α = a
yt(i)
At
, mt(i)
1−α = (1− a)yt(i)
At
, (12)
where a = a1−αl and (1− a) = a1−αm .
It is assumed that prices are sticky: as in the model of Calvo (1983),
each firm at a given date changes its price in a rational, optimizing, forward-
looking way with probability 1 − γ. Those firms which do not optimize at
the given date follow a rule of thumb, as in the models of Christiano et al.
(2001) and Smets and Wouters (2003), and update their prices according to
the past inflation rate. The optimizing firms take into account the above
described characteristics of the price setting process, and the form of the
demand function represented by equation (11). These conditions imply that
the inflation rate is determined by the following equation:
pit − ϑpit−1 = βEt [pit+1 − ϑpit] + ξm˜ct + υ˜t, (13)
where
ξ =
(1− γ)(1− βγ)
γ [1 + θα(1− α)−1] , (14)
and ϑ ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of implicit indexation, and mct is the average real
marginal cost. The interpretation of the stochastic shock υ˜t is similar to that
of υ˜wt .
5Thus, I apply the approach of McCallum and Nelson (2001), Smets and Wouters
(2002) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003), who consider imports as a production input.
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2.3 Equilibrium conditions
The equilibrium conditions of the goods and labor market are
yt = ct + xt, (15)
lt =
∫ 1
0
lt(i) di. (16)
2.4 The log-linearized model
This section summarizes the log-linearized equations determining trajectories
of the endogenous variables for given initial conditions and paths of the
exogenous variables. Variables without time indices refer to their steady-
state values, and the tilde denotes the log-deviation of a variable from its
steady-state value.
Combination of the log-linearized version of equations (4) and (6) provides
the following formula for domestic consumption:(
1 + βh2
)
c˜t − βhEt [c˜t+1]− hc˜t−1 (17)
=
(
1 + βh2
)
c˜∗t − βhEt
[
c˜∗t+1
]− hc˜∗t−1 + (1− h)(1− βh)σ (q˜dt + P˜ F∗t ) .
Foreign behavior is not modelled explicitly, it is just assumed that the fol-
lowing ad hoc formula, similar to the consumption equation, determines the
demand for exports:(
1 + βh2
)
x˜t − βhEt [x˜t+1]− hx˜t−1 = ηq˜dt + x˜∗t , (18)
where 0 < η, shock x∗t represents the exogenous component of exports de-
mand.
Let us log-linearize the demand functions, then
(1− α)l˜t(i) = (1− α)m˜t(i) = y˜t(i)− A˜t.
This implies that
(1− α)l˜t = (1− α)m˜t = y˜t − A˜t
since log-linearization neglects second and higher order approximation error
terms.6 The demand for labor can be derived from the previous expression,
(1− α)l˜t = ac˜t + (1− a)x˜t − A˜t, (19)
6If a variable is defined in the following manner: z =
∫ 1
0
z(i) di then its log-linear
approximation yields z˜ =
∫ 1
0
z˜(i) di + o2, where o2 denotes those second and higher order
errors, which were neglected in the approximation process.
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where it is used that c/(c+ x) = a.
Substituting the log-linearized real marginal cost into equation (13) yields
the price setting equation
pit − ϑpit−1 = βEt [pit+1 − ϑpit] + ξ α
1− α [ac˜t + (1− a)x˜t] (20)
+ ξ
[
al
W
W z
w˜t + am
ePm∗
W z
(
q˜dt + P˜
m∗
t
)
− A˜t
1− α
]
+ υ˜t.
If one combines the log-linearized version of equations (8) and (10), then one
obtains the following wage setting equation:
piwt − ϑwpit−1 = βEt
[
piwt+1 − ϑwpit
]
(21)
+ξw
{
ϕl˜t +
σ [(1 + βh2) c˜t − βhEt [c˜t+1]− hc˜t−1]
(1− h)(1− βh) − w˜t
}
+ υ˜wt .
Finally, two identities close the system:
piwt = w˜t − w˜t−1 + pit, (22)
pit = q˜
d
t−1 − q˜dt + de˜t, (23)
where de˜t = e˜t − e˜t−1.
The seven-equation system of equations (17) – (23) determines the paths
of the following seven endogenous variables: q˜dt , pit, pi
w
t , c˜t, x˜t, l˜t, and w˜t. The
stochastic shocks of the model are c˜∗t , x˜
∗
t , P˜
F∗
t , P˜
m∗
t , υ˜t, υ˜
w
t , and A˜t.
2.5 The social welfare function and the consumption
gap
Following Woodford (2003, ch. 6), Appendix B.2 demonstrates that the
second-order approximation of the model-based social welfare function yields
a quadratic formula of the form
−
∞∑
t=1
βt−1E1
[
λc (cˆt − δcˆt−1)2
]
(24)
−
∞∑
t=1
βt−1E1
[
λpi(pit − ϑpit−1)2 + λw(piwt − ϑwpit−1)2
]
,
where coefficients λc, λpi, λw are functions of parameters of the model, and
0 < δ ≤ h is a function of the parameter h.
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I refer to the variable cˆt as the consumption gap. The appearance of the
lag of the consumption gap in the objective function (24) is due to habit
formation. Variable cˆt is defined as the percentage deviation of actual con-
sumption from an appropriately defined welfare reference level of consump-
tion, i.e.
cˆt = c˜t − c˜wrt , (25)
where [(
1 + βh2
)
σ¯ +
φ
1− α +
α
1− α
]
c˜wrt − βhσ¯Et
[
c˜wrt+1
]− hσ¯c˜wrt−1
=
1 + ϕ
1− α
[
A˜t + (1− a) (c˜t − x˜t)
]
, (26)
and σ¯ = σ[(1− h)(1− βh)]−1.
In most models the welfare reference level corresponds to the flexible
price and wage version of the model. In this model the welfare reference
level is different, since there is an externality, which is the consequence of
openness.7 In the closed economy version of the model c˜wr would depend
only on productivity shock A˜t, expression (1− a) (c˜t − x˜t) is the outcome of
openness.
Using definitions (25) and (26) one can obtain the process determining
the consumption gap:[(
1 + βh2
)
σ¯ +
φ
1− α +
α
1− α
]
cˆt − βhσ¯Et [cˆt+1]− hσ¯cˆt−1 (27)
=
[(
1 + βh2
)
σ¯ +
φ
1− α +
α
1− α
]
c˜t − βhσ¯Et [c˜t+1]− hσ¯c˜t−1
−1 + ϕ
1− α
[
A˜t + (1− a) (c˜t − x˜t)
]
.
In usual ad-hoc objectives functions of monetary policy there is a CPI
inflation rate term. However, the objective function (24) contains the quasi-
difference of CPI inflation pit − ϑpit−1, and the difference of wage and lagged
CPI inflation piwt − ϑwpit−1. Since expression (24) is derived from the model,
the above terms represent certain welfare-decreasing distortions of the model.
It is assumed that price and wage setting is asynchronized, hence the CPI
and wage inflation result in not only a change of the aggregate price and wage
indices, but inefficient relative price and wage movements as well. Since the
magnitude of relative price and wage distortions depend on the size of im-
plicit indexation, the terms ϑpit−1 and ϑwpiwt−1 have to appear in the objective
function.
7Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a) and (2001b) discuss in detail how different actions of
domestic economic policy influence foreign welfare.
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2.6 Model solution and parameterization
Uhlig’s (1999) implementation of the undetermined coefficients method is
used to derive the resolution of the log-linear model. The numerical results
are generated by the aforementioned author’s MATLAB algorithm.
The values of the basic parameters in the benchmark economy are given in
Table 1. The value of β is taken from King and Rebello (1999). Parameters σ
and h are taken from Christiano et al. (2001).The value α is chosen to ensure
that labor’s share in GDP is approximately 50 per cent. In order to get an
appropriate approximation of the social welfare function, it is necessary to
ensure that difference of consumption and exports, i.e. c˜t − x˜t depends only
on stochastic shocks and initial conditions. This requirement is fulfilled if the
parameters of equations (17) and (18) satisfy the condition η = (1− h)(1−
βh)/σ; details are presented in Appendix B.2. The values of ϕ, θw, γw, ϑw
are Euro area estimates, taken from the paper of Smets and Wouters (2003).
Since in that paper the pricing equation is estimated under the assumption
of constant returns to scale, I take the values of γs and ϑs from the study
of Gal´ı et al. (2001), which also contains Euro area estimates In that study
they interpret inflation persistency differently from the approach I use. They
use the model of Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), and assume that each firm updates
its price in a given period by probability 1−γG. Hence, according to the law
of large numbers in a given period 1− γG fraction of the firms change their
prices. But only 1 − ϑG fraction of the price setters choose their prices in
an optimal forward-looking manner, the rest update their prices according
to the past inflation rate. If β = 1, then the approach I use and the one used
by Gal´ı and Gertler coincides, if ϑ = ϑG/γG. Although in our case β 6= 1,
as an approximation I used the above mentioned formula to determine the
value of ϑG.
The above parameter values are used in the benchmark simulations. How-
ever, an alternative version is considered, where the persistency parameters
of the CPI and wage inflation processes are much higher, i.e. ϑ = ϑw = 0.9.
This sensitivity analysis is motivated by the study of Hornok and Jakab
(2003). They used a Hungarian, relatively short, data set and found much
more persistent inflation than Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), Gal´ı et al. (2001),
and Smets and Wouters (2003) estimated using US and European data. It
is not clear whether this discrepancy is due to the confused expectations in-
duced by the 2001 exchange-rate regime switch in Hungary, or to more rigid
price setting behavior. If the first hypothesis is true, then some near-rational
expectation models should explain the phenomenon, e.g., adaptive learning
models, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001). But in this case, in the long
run the price setting behavior would converge to the practice of developed
10
countries, and low persistency parameters would appropriately describe the
inflation process. On the other hand, if the price setting practice in Hungary
is significantly different from the practice of developed countries, then infla-
tion would remain highly persistent even in the long run. To select the right
explanation needs further research and more data.
Table 1
Parameter values
of the benchmark
economy
Parameter
Name Value
β 0.984
σ 1.000
h 0.630
ϕ 0.755
η 0.141
α 0.100
θ 6.000
θw 3.000
γ 0.787
ϑ 0.365
γw 0.763
ϑw 0.656
3 Comparison with other small open econ-
omy models
3.1 Derivation of the social welfare function
An important advantage of utility-based general equilibrium models is that
they do not need to rely on ad-hoc social welfare criteria. It is possible to
derive an exact social welfare function from the model itself, and this makes
a rigorous welfare analysis possible. However, this remains only a possibility
if a model is technically intractable. That is why the finding of Woodford
(2003, ch. 6) is important, in that he derived a tractable approximation of
the social welfare function in a closed economy framework under relatively
mild assumptions.
In a closed economy model it is enough to assume that the steady-state
allocation satisfies a certain social welfare criterion. This assumption elim-
inates first-order terms of the approximation of the social welfare function,
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which is necessary since the presence of these terms makes optimization re-
sults inaccurate.
In small open economy models one needs further assumption to ensure
the above requirement. E.g. Gal´ı and Monacelli (2002) impose restrictions
both on the intratemporal and intertemporal substitution parameter in such
a way that international trade is balanced at all times.
My restrictions are different, but they are also related to the behavior of
the trade balance. To be more specific, it is assumed that the parameters of
equations (17) and (18) satisfy
η =
(1− h)(1− βh)
σ
.
This condition ensures that the difference c˜t− x˜t depends only on stochastic
shocks and initial conditions, i.e. it is independent of endogenous variables
and economic policy. Appendix B.2 shows that the above condition and
the Leontieff form of the technology guarantee the elimination of first-order
terms.8
An interesting feature of the model of Gal´ı and Monacelli is that domestic
inflation and not CPI inflation is the proper welfare measure. In my model
there is no distinction between the two, since domestic consumption goods
are home made, and imports are used for production.
3.2 Stabilization of the consumption gap and inflation
It is a well known feature of closed economy New Keynesian models that if
wages are flexible and there are no cost-push shocks, then it is possible for
there to be the simultaneous stabilization of the relevant welfare measures:
the output gap and inflation. See, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999), Goodfriend
and King (1997), Gal´ı (2002), and Woodford (2003, ch. 7).
Gal´ı and Monacelli (2002) show that if some certain conditions are satis-
fied, then even in small open economies the simultaneous stabilization of the
output gap and the appropriate measure of inflation is possible.
Let us study whether similar assumptions make simultaneous stabilization
possible in my model. Recall that in this model the relevant welfare measure
is not the output gap, but a similar concept, the consumption gap. Let us
assume that wages are flexible (1/ξw = 0), and there are no cost push shocks
υ˜t = υ˜
w
t = 0. Furthermore, for the sake of simpler comparison, suppose
h = 0, α = 0, and x˜∗t = P˜
x∗
t = P˜
m∗
t = 0.
8It could be an interesting further research topic to relax the above restrictive assump-
tions, e.g., by the application of the methods described in Benigno and Woodford (2003)
or Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004).
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If wages are flexible, then combining equations (19) and (21) yields
(σ + aϕ)c˜t + (1− a)ϕx˜t − ϕA˜t = w˜t.
Substituting this into equation (20) yields the following price setting equa-
tion:
pit − ϑpit−1 = βEt [pit+1 − ϑpit] + ξa W
W z
(σ + aϕ)c˜t + ξa
W
W z
(1− a)ϕx˜t
+ ξ(1− a)eP
m∗
W z
q˜dt −
(
1 + a
W
W z
ϕ
)
A˜t.
Replace consumption and exports: since h = 0 and α = 0, equation (27)
implies that
c˜t = νccˆt + νA˜t − (1− a)νx˜t,
where νc = [σ(1− a) + ϕ]/[σ(1− a) + ϕ− (1 + ϕ)α] and
ν = (1 + ϕ)/[σ(1 − a) + ϕ − (1 + ϕ)α]. Using the above expression and
equation (18) the price setting equation can be expressed as
pit − ϑpit−1 = βEt [pit+1 − ϑpit] + ξa W
W z
(σ + aϕ)νccˆt
+ξ
{
(1− a)eP
m∗
W z
+ a
W
W z
η [(1− a)ϕ− (σ + aϕ)(1− a)ν]
}
q˜dt
−
(
1 + a
W
W z
ϕ− (σ + aϕ)ν
)
A˜t.
Obviously, in this case it is impossible to stabilize simultaneously the con-
sumption gap and inflation, since in the price setting equation, beyond the
consumption gap, there is another endogenous variable q˜dt , and it is easy to
show that the coefficient of the productivity shock is non-zero. Simultaneous
stabilization is possible only in the closed economy version of this model, i.e.
when a = 1. In this case W = W z, νc = 1, and ν = (1+ϕ)/(σ+ϕ), thus the
price setting equation becomes the standard New Keynesian closed economy
Phillips curve,
pit − ϑpit−1 = βEt [pit+1 − ϑpit] + ξ(σ + ϕ)cˆt.
The model of Monacelli (2003), which can be considered as a generaliza-
tion of the model of Gal´ı and Monacelli, has the same property, i.e. simulta-
neous stabilization is impossible. Monacelli in his generalized model relaxes
the assumption of perfect import price pass-through. Imperfect pass-through
implies his impossibility result. In my model import price pass-through is
perfect. But since the imported goods are not used for consumption, the
pass-through between the nominal exchange rate and CPI becomes imper-
fect, as in the model of Monacelli. Thus, it comes as no surprise that in my
model simultaneous stabilization is also impossible.
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3.3 Fixed versus flexible exchange rate
As mentioned in the Introduction, the new member states do not have the
option of remaining outside the Monetary Union. From this point of view
it is worthless considering whether it is better to maintain an independent
exchange rate policy. However, it may still be interesting to briefly discuss
this problem.
Although some models with pricing to market and local currency pricing
support fixed exchange rate regimes, the majority of the NOEM literature
assert that flexible regimes are optimal, see Obstfeld (2001, 2002). The basic
argument is the following. Nominal rigidities prevent the economy from
optimal adjustment. On the other hand, in the presence of nominal rigidities
nominal-exchange-rate policy can influence real-exchange movements. As a
consequence, an appropriate exchange rate policy can facilitate the necessary
adjustments of real economic variables.9
But all the above arguments are based on the assumption that the mon-
etary authority can perfectly control the nominal exchange rate at all times.
However, there is a literature relatig to the volatility of nominal exchange
rates. As Lyons (2001) discusses, there are two important unresolved puzzles
in exchange rate economics: the determination puzzle, and the excess volatil-
ity puzzle. The determination puzzle is related to the fact that exchange rate
movements are virtually unrelated to the best measures of fundamentals. The
excess volatility puzzle is related to the phenomenon that exchange rates are
excessively volatile relative to the best measures of fundamentals. These is-
sues represent especially important problems in emerging market countries,
as documented by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). Thus, perfect exchange rate
stability supported institutionally by the Monetary Union can be attractive
for the new accession countries, and can improve social welfare.
4 The optimal conversion rate
4.1 Analysis of the impulse responses
Before discussing the properties of the optimal solution, it is worthwhile
analyzing the characteristics of the model by its impulse-response functions.
First, the effects of 1 percent initial (date t = 0) deviations of the state
variables are discussed. Then the effects of exogenous shocks are studied. For
all variables two set of simulations will be performed, one for low persistency
9Moreover, in the model of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2002) the increased volatility of CPI
inflation induced by a flexible exchange rate is not harmful for the welfare since domestic
inflation is the relevant welfare measure.
14
of inflation (ϑ = ϑw = 0.365), and one for high persistency (ϑ = ϑw = 0.9).
The interpretation of one time period in the model is one quarter. The upper
four panels of the figures belong to the low persistency case, the lower panels
to the high persistency version. Figures display the price and wage inflation
rate by annualized terms.
State variables
Figure 1 displays the impulse responses induced by 1 percent annual inflation
rate at date 0. The inflation rate returns to its steady-state value in three
quarters if the persistency is small, and in one year if it is high, but in this
latter case undershooting is significant. Since the fixed nominal exchange rate
does not move together with inflation, the domestic component of the real
exchange rate appreciates, which results in recession: both the consumption
gap and labor utilization decline. If the persistence of inflation is high, then
the decline is much stronger. Since it is assumed that η = (1− h)(1− βh)/σ,
equations (17) and (18) imply that c˜t and x˜t moves together perfectly. Thus,
equation (26) implies that c˜wr is constant, and formula (27) guarantees that
the consumption gap moves together with consumption and exports as well.
Figure 2 displays impulse responses corresponding to consumption. As
equation (17) reveals, c˜t gradually converges to its steady-state value. The
path of labor utilization is similar. On the other hand, the real wage level
hardly exhibits any reaction. This is possible, because if wages are sticky,
these two variables do not necessarily move together. The reaction of price
and wage inflation, and the domestic component of the real exchange rate is
negligible compared to that of the consumption gap and labor. If inflation
persistence increases, then the size of the movements do not change signifi-
cantly, but the shape of the trajectories become modified: after converging
back to the steady-state values, the variables undershoot, and keep moving
cyclically with decreasing amplitude. The effects of a 1 percent initial de-
viation of exports are similar to that of consumption, hence its graphical
analysis is skipped.
Figure 3 plots the impulse responses corresponding to 1 percent initial
deviation of the real wage level. This level returns slowly, in more than five
years, to its steady-state value. This has two effects: on the one hand, it de-
creases wage inflation, while, on the other, it increases CPI inflation, though
this latter effect is much weaker. In addition, it has a contraction effect both
on consumption and labor, but this effect is also weak. Consumption and
exports perfectly moves together with the consumption gap again.
It is worthwhile analyzing the effects of the domestic component of the
real exchange rate q˜d0 and the nominal-exchange-rate depreciation de˜1 to-
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gether. If one investigates the system of equations (17) – (22), and (27), then
it becomes apparent that neither q˜dt−1 nor de˜t appear in it. On the other
hand, in identity (23) both appear, and their coefficients are the same in
absolute value. This implies that if the domestic component of the real ex-
change rate is undervalued by 1 percent at date t = 0, then it has exactly
the same effect as that of a 1 percent depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate at date t = 1.
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses corresponding to a 1 percent depre-
ciation of the nominal exchange rate at date t = 1. It has significant positive
effect on the consumption gap, price and wage inflation, and labor utiliza-
tion. They return to their steady-state values in nearly five years. Since the
coefficients of the real exchange rate in equations (17) and (18) are the same,
consumption and export move together again. Thus, equation (27) implies
that the consumption gap also moves with them.
Exogenous shocks
Now the effects of exogenous stochastic shocks will be investigated. Using
the estimation results of Ireland (2004) it is assumed that the autoregressive
parameters of the shocks are equal to 0.95.
Let us start with the foreign-business-cycle shock c˜∗t : Figure 5 plots the
corresponding impulse responses. This shock has a significant impact on the
consumption gap, consumption and labor. It increases the real wage level,
and consequently, wage inflation as well. The reaction of price inflation is
much weaker. The effects of the exports-demand shock x˜∗t and the foreign-
CPI shock P˜ F∗t are similar. Although, the increase in wage inflation is weaker
in both cases, and the increase in labor utilization is stronger when x˜∗t is
considered.
The import-price shock P˜m∗t has only negligible impact on the variables,
hence its graphical analysis is omitted.
Figure 6 displays the impacts of the cost-push shock υ˜t. The size of
the shock is set at 0.08 per cent, hence it yields just 1 percentage point
extra inflation at date t = 1 if the persistence is low. Beyond its positive
impact on inflation, it negatively influences consumption and labor. The
change of the inflation persistence parameters modifies the trajectories: the
strong undershooting of the inflation rate is especially interesting in the high
persistency case.
Figure 7 plots the impulse responses related to the nominal-wage shock
υ˜wt . The size of the shock is set in such a way that it induces 1 percentage
point extra wage inflation at date t = 1 if the persistence is low. The reactions
induced by υ˜wt are similar to that of υ˜t. However, it induces a greater increase
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of wage inflation, and a much smaller rise of inflation. Furthermore, the real
wage level increases, and the decline of consumption, exports, and labor
utilization are smaller.
The impulse responses generated by the productivity shock A˜t can be
found in Figure 7. A rise of productivity negatively influences inflation,
this results in appreciation of the real exchange rate, since the nominal ex-
change rate is fixed. Thus, equation (17) implies that consumption rises. But
this boom is relatively small compared to the size of productivity growth:
hence the net effect of these two factors on labor demand is negative. Equa-
tion (26) implies that increasing productivity coincides with increasing c˜wrt ,
hence, although consumption increases, the consumption gap declines. As
Gal´ı (2002) discussed, it is a general feature of New Keynesian models that
a rise of productivity results in decreasing labor demand. Moreover, this can
be supported by recent empirical studies, although these findings sharply
contradict the predictions of real business cycle (RBC) literature.
4.2 Analysis of the optimal solution
In this model there is only one policy variable: the monetary authority de-
cides how to peg the nominal exchange rate at the accession date. Formally,
this means that the depreciation rate de˜1 is a decision variable, but de˜t = 0,
for all t ≥ 2.
The optimal conversion rate is a result of the following optimization prob-
lem: policy makers have to choose de˜1 in order to maximize objective function
(24), subject to the equations determining the trajectories of endogenous
variables, and given Y0, S1, i.e. the vector of the state variables and the
exogenous shocks, respectively.
It is shown in Appendix B.3 that the solution of the above described
problem yields the following expression:
de˜1 = −
∑6
j=1KYj Y0(j) +
∑9
s=2KSs S1(s)
KS1
,
the formulas for the coefficients in the above expression are also presented in
the Appendix.
If, keeping everything else fixed, the jth state variable is above its steady-
state value by 1 per cent, then decision makers should devaluate the nominal
exchange rate by −KYj /KS1 per cent in order to settle the optimal conversion
rate. Similarly if, keeping everything else fixed, the sth shock variable is
above its steady-state value by 1 per cent, then a −KSs /KS1 per cent devalu-
ation is the optimal response.
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Effects of the state variables
Table 2 displays the optimal-policy multipliers corresponding to the state
variables (−KYj /KS1 ). The first row of the table contains the results of the
model version with low inflation persistency, while the second row belongs
to the version with high persistency. The multipliers of the inflation rate are
expressed in annualized terms. A positive number in the table refers to a
required devaluation.10
Table 2
Optimal multipliers of the state variables
Degree of inflation State variables
persistence q˜d0 pi0 c˜0 x˜0 w˜0
low -1 0.181 -0.032 -0.044 0.386
high -1 0.706 -0.056 -0.086 0.534
Note: A positive entry refers to a required devaluation as an
optimal policy response.
Following the discussion in the previous section, the value of the multiplier
of q˜dt comes as no surprise. It means that if the domestic component of the
real exchange rate q˜dt , which represents practical misalignment indices in our
model, is appreciated by 1 percent at date t = 0, then the decision makers’
optimal response is a 1 per cent devaluation of the nominal exchange rate at
date t = 1. This action would perfectly neutralize the effects of real exchange
rate misalignment.
At first sight, it is surprising that the multiplier of the inflation rate is
positive. This means that if the initial inflation rate is positive, then policy
makers have to respond with a devaluation. The reason for this is that in
the social welfare function (24) pit and pi
w
t do not appear themselves, rather
their divergence from the past inflation rate. Thus, a too quick disinflation
decreases welfare, just like a further increase of inflation. Hence, the optimal
solution is moderate disinflation.
But, still it might be asked, how is it possible to reconcile any kind of
disinflation with a depreciation? The answer is the following. If the inflation
rate is given, then an exchange rate policy is neutral, if it devaluates at the
same rate as that of the inflation. In this case the real exchange rate remains
constant. If the inherited inflation rate is positive, then fixing the nominal
exchange rate results in real depreciation, since the inflation rate does not
become immediately zero. It has very similar effect if one fixes the nominal
10Variable cˆt is absent from the table. Although formally it is a state variable, it does not
affect any other variables, since it appears only in equation (27). Thus, the corresponding
policy multiplier is equal to zero.
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exchange rate after a mild devaluation, it yields real appreciation, a negative
consumption gap and disinflation.11
According to Table 2, if consumption is above its steady-state value by
1 per cent, then the optimal reaction is a revaluation. After the inspection
of Figure 2 this becomes clear, since all three variables entering the social
welfare function, i.e. the consumption gap, price and wage inflation arrive
above their steady-state values.
The calculations reveal that if the initial real wage is above its steady-
state value at date 0, then the decision makers should devaluate. Figure
3 reveals the reason for this: the deviation of the real wage level yields a
small increase of CPI inflation, a substantial decrease of wage inflation, and
a negative consumption gap.
Numerical values of the optimal multipliers change significantly if one
modifies the persistency parameters. It comes as no surprise that the multi-
plier of the inflation rate changes the most, in the high persistency version
it becomes nearly four times bigger than in the low persistency case. But
multipliers of other variables are nearly doubled as well.
Effects of the exogenous shocks
Let us study the optimal-policy multipliers corresponding to the exogenous
shocks (−KSs /KS1 ). The results are summarized in Table 3. Shocks υ˜t and υ˜wt
are normalized in such a way that they induce 1 percent extra price or wage
inflation in the baseline version of the model.
Table 3
Optimal multipliers of the exogenous shocks
Degree of Exogenous shocks
inflation
persistence c˜∗1 c˜
∗
0 x˜
∗
1 P˜
F∗
1 P˜
m∗
1 υ˜1 υ˜
w
1 A˜1
low -0.796 -0.566 -1.242 -0.604 0.012 0.050 -0.750 0.560
high -1.201 -0.747 -1.554 -0.799 0.137 0.581 -0.951 0.560
Note: A positive entry refers to a required devaluation as an optimal policy response.
Remarkably large multipliers belong to the contemporary and past real-
izations of the foreign business-cycle shock c˜∗t and the export-demand shock
x˜∗t . Positive shocks require revaluations as an optimal response in both cases,
11This argument, of course, does not mean that disinflation with nominal revaluation is
necessarily a faulty policy. For example, it is possible that a given country can only meet
the deadline of the Maastricht criteria of the Monetary Union if it performs such a radical
disinflation that can be reconciled only with exchange rate revaluation.
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since, as was discussed in section 4.1, they induce a rise in the consumption
gap, as well as CPI and wage inflation: see Figure 5.
The foreign-CPI shock P˜ F∗t also features a significant multiplier, and the
optimal reaction for a positive shock is also a revaluation. The reason is the
same as previously. On the other hand, the effect of the import-price shock
P˜m∗t is negligible, and its multiplier has an opposite sign.
There are two types of cost-push shocks in the model: υ˜t is the shock of the
price setting process, υ˜wt is that of the wage setting process. If persistency
is high both have remarkable effects. On the other hand, if persistency is
low, then the multiplier of υ˜t is relatively small. It is interesting that the
multipliers of the two shocks have opposite signs. A positive price shock
requires a devaluation, as in the case of the import-price shock. The reason
is the same as in the case of a positive inflation rate at date 0, discussed
previously. However, a positive wage setting shock requires a revaluation,
since the induced rate of wage inflation is higher than that of CPI inflation:
see Figure 7.
A positive productivity shock A˜t requires significant devaluation, since
it reduces the output gap, see Figure 8, as was discussed in the previous
section.
Note that again most of the result are quite sensitive to the persistency
parameter of the inflation process, the only exception is the productivity
shock.
Summary
To summarize this subsection, the domestic component of the real exchange
rate has a key but not exclusive role in determining the optimal conversion
rate. Its role is prominent, since its optimal multiplier is stable, indepen-
dent of the parameter values of the model, and the value of its multiplier is
significantly higher in absolute value than that of other variables.
On the other hand, a decision based exclusively on the initial real ex-
change rate would be suboptimal, since an undervalued or overvalued real
exchange rate always coincides with deviations of other variables, and some
of these variables have significant multipliers. The past inflation rate and
the past real wage level are the most important state variables, while the
shocks of the foreign business cycle, foreign CPI, nominal wage level and
productivity are the most important exogenous factors.
It is important to note that the optimal-policy multipliers of most vari-
ables change significantly if persistency parameters are modified. Thus, for
the right decision in a certain economy it would be necessary to know thor-
oughly the empirical characteristics of price and wage formation processes.
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4.3 Practical issues
This section briefly reviews how one should apply the theoretical results of
this study in practice.
To start with, I clarify the interpretation of the steady state of the model.
In this model, as is usual in the business cycle literature, the long-run paths
of the variables are filtered out. The object of the analysis is the cyclical
behavior of the variables around the long-run trajectories, and not the long-
run behavior. Hence, the steady state of the model represents these long-run
paths, which are not modelled explicitly.
It is assumed that the long-run growth of the real variables in the model
are determined by two factors: long-run technological progress and the con-
vergence of per capita real income to the growth path of developed countries,
i.e. the transitional dynamics. These processes can be properly captured by
neoclassical open economy models of growth – see, e.g., Barro et al. (1992)
– and long-run evolution of nominal variables are determined by long-run
money supply.
It is demonstrated that one of the key determinants of the optimal con-
version rate is a certain misalignment index, namely, the deviation of the
domestic component of the real exchange rate from its steady state value,
or in other words, its deviation from its long-run path. That is why it is
important to identify empirically the long-run trajectory of this variable.
The literature dealing with practical equilibrium real exchange rate estima-
tions gives some guidelines. Although the notions of that literature are not
perfectly compatible with the categories of general equilibrium neoclassical
models of growth, one can try to reconcile them.
In their survey of equilibrium real exchange rate concepts Driver and
Westaway (2003) define the long-run equilibrium as the point when net
wealth is in full stock-flow equilibrium, so that changes to asset stocks are
zero. In a neoclassical model of growth this happens when the transition
process is over, i.e. per capita real incomes are equalized. Since the steady
state of my model does not represent this state of the economy, it rather cor-
responds to the medium-run equilibrium concepts of practical misalignment
calculations.
The key nominal endogenous variable of this model is the inflation rate. In
the model its steady state value is zero. But in reality the long-run inflation
rate is usually positive, in the EU it is around two percent. That is, it is
useful to add two percentage points to the inflation numbers of this paper.
One may criticize my result related to the inflation rate as irrelevant,
since the Maastricht criteria require that the inflation rate of accession coun-
tries cannot be significantly higher than their long-run values. But this study
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demonstrates that if inflation persistency is high, then at the end of a dis-
inflation process there can occur serious undershooting of the long-run value
of inflation. Due to procedural reasons, at the accession date it is improb-
able that the conversion rate can be modified as much as optimality would
require. Thus, if in a given economy the persistence of inflation is high or
uncertain, then it is better to start the disinflation process long before the
accession. If there is enough time for disinflation, then the potential under-
shooting will disappear prior to the accession date, and the inflation rate will
be close enough to its long-run value. Hence, a nominal-exchange-rate align-
ment would not be necessary when the country joins the Monetary Union.
Some limitations of the model for direct policy application have to be
mentioned.
First, the conversion rates of accession countries are a result of a multi-
lateral decision, and the welfare of all the concerned countries is taken into
account: but in this model the welfare of only one accession country is con-
sidered.
Second, it is not taken into account in this model that accession countries
can be viewed as competing peripheral countries, which trade with the center
of the EU. In this case, as it was shown in the paper of Corsetti et al. (1999), a
given nominal exchange rate movement can have different effects depending
on the relative weight of trade with the center and with other peripheral
countries.
Third, in the model there is no unemployment. However, Vila´gi (2004b)
demonstrates that some welfare implications of NOEM models are sensitive
to the assumptions about the labor market.
Fourth, in this model the government’s budget is always balanced. How-
ever, a budget deficit may have inflationary effects, see, e.g., Woodford
(2001). Thus, it has implications for the determination of the conversion
rate.
Finally, the Balassa – Samuelson (BS) effect (i.e. the productivity induced
divergence of sectoral inflation rates and the accompanying real appreciation)
is not considered here. Vila´gi (2004a) reviewed its empirical significance, and
it may have implications for the choice of the optimal conversion rate: as Aoki
(2001) and Benigno (2001) demonstrated, the optimal policy should put more
weight to stabilization of the inflation rate in the sector with stronger nominal
rigidities. Thus, in economies with diverging sectoral inflation rates, and with
significantly different sectoral rigidities it is not sufficient to consider only the
average inflation rate for the determination of the optimal conversion rate.
The reason why the BS effect is neglected is that in order to derive a
tractable social welfare function one has to impose restrictions on the co-
movement of consumption and export. (See the details in section 3.1 and
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Appendix B.2.) The restrictions applied in this model contradict the pricing
to market assumption, which is necessary in a NOEM model to generate the
BS effect, as it was demonstrated in Vila´gi (2004a).
5 Conclusions
This paper has examinded how a country joining the European Economic
and Monetary Union should choose its conversion rate. It was shown that,
contrary to the widespread approach of the non-academic economic policy
literature, it is not enough to base this decision exclusively on one factor,
namely, the real exchange rate. It was demonstrated that although the mis-
alignment of the real exchange rate was a key factor in the determination
of the conversion rate, it did not have an exclusive role in determining the
optimal conversion rate.
A proper misalignment index is proved to be a robust, parameter inde-
pendent, and significant factor. On the other hand, the inflation rate and the
real wage level are another key state variables which have to be taken into
consideration for the determination of the conversion rate. Furthermore, the
foreign-business-cycle, foreign-price, nominal-wage and productivity shocks
are exogenous factors also containing significant information for proper policy
decision-making.
The importance of using a model-based social welfare function instead
of ad-hoc welfare criteria was also demonstrated. Due to the persistence of
inflation process the exact social welfare function derived from the model
contains both contemporary and past rates of inflation. As a consequence,
the optimal policy reaction to some variables substantially differs from that
derived from models with ad-hoc policy objective functions.
Furthermore, it was shown that the optimal exchange rate policy changed
significantly if persistency of CPI and wage inflation were modified. Thus, for
the right decision on the conversion rate in a certain economy it is necessary
to have a thorough knowledge of the empirical characteristics of price and
wage setting processes.
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A Appendix
A.1 The steady state
In this section the non-stochastic steady state of the model is described.
Variables without time indices refer to their steady-state values.
The labor and imports demand functions, i.e. equations (12) have the
following form in the steady state:
l1−α = a
c
A
, m1−α = (1− a) c
A
,
where it is used that in the steady state all firms have the same level of
production and input demand. It is assumed that x/A = m1−α, as a conse-
quence, x = c(1− a)/a, or l1−α = c/A. Thus, the labor demand is the same
as in a closed economy with similar technology, but z = l.
Furthermore, it is assumed that in the steady state international trade is
balanced, hence Px = ePm∗m. Let us take as given the share of exports in
GDP:
sx =
Px
Pc+ Px− ePm∗m =
x
c
=
1− a
a
.
According to Hungarian data approximately sx = 0.6, hence a = 0.625 and
x = 0.6c. Coefficients al and am can be calculated as a = a
1−α
l and (1− a) =
a1−αm . Thus, al = 0.593 and am = 0.336.
It is assumed that in the steady state c is equal to the welfare maximizing
consumption level of the above closed economy. The social welfare maximiz-
ing allocation can be given by the solution of the following optimization
problem:
max
ct
∞∑
t=1
βt−1E1
[
u(ct − hct−1)− v
(
cα¯t A
−α¯
t
)]
,
where α¯ = (1− α)−1. The corresponding first-order condition in the steady-
state is
u′(c(1− h))(1− βh) = α¯v′ (cα¯A−α¯))cαˆAα¯, (28)
where αˆ = αα¯. This implies that
1 = α¯
(1− h)σ
1− βh c
σ+ϕα¯+αˆA−(1+ϕ)α¯.
For the sake of simplicity, let us choose A such that 1 = (c + x)αˆA−α¯, i.e.
(c+x)α = A. x = (1−a)c/a, and this implies that A = (c/a)α. Substituting
this into the previous expression yields
1 = α¯
(1− h)σ
1− βh c
σ+ϕa(1+ϕ)αˆ.
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Thus, c = 1.224 and A = 1.070. Using l1−α = c/A one obtains l = 1.618.
The steady-state form of the labor supply equation is
W
P
= µw ((1− h)c)σ lϕ,
where it is assumed that µw = θw/(θw − 1) = 1.5 and P = 1. Hence,
W = 0.665.
Balanced international trade implies that
Pm∗
P
= Ax−αˆ,
where I used that e = 1 and m = xα¯/A. Knowing c one can calculate that
x = 0, 735, hence Pm∗ = 1, 107.
The steady-state form of the price setting equation is
1 = µα¯(c+ x)αˆA−α¯
(
al
W
P
+ am
Pm∗
P
)
.
There is only one value of µ which satisfies this equation, since α¯ is a given
parameter, and it is assumed that (c+ x)αˆA−α¯ = 1, and al, am, W , Pm∗/P
were calculated previously. Let us assume that the government sets the
tax/transfer variable τ in such a way that the price setting equation is sat-
isfied, hence µ = 1.174.
A.2 Second-order approximation of the social welfare
function
Following Woodford (2003, ch. 6), this section provides a second-order Taylor
approximation of the social welfare function, which is the aggregate utility
function of households. The social welfare function is the following:
U(Y0, S) =
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
u(Ht)−
∫ 1
0
v(lt(j)) dj
]
, (29)
where Y0 is the vector of the date 0 state variables, S=[S1, S2, S3, . . .], and St
is the vector of the shock variables at date t. The Taylor approximation of
the consumption term around the steady state is
u(Ht) = u
′(H) (∆ct − h∆ct−1) + 1
2
u′′(H)
[
(∆ct)
2 + h2 (∆ct−1)
2]
− hu′′(H)∆ct∆ct−1 + t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) ,
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where ∆ct = ct− c, o (||S||3) contains the third and higher order error terms,
and “t.i.p.” means terms that are independent of policy, which are constant
terms and exogenous variables. Obviously, exchange rate policy does not
affect these terms.
Expressions
∆ct = c
(
c˜t +
1
2
c˜2t
)
+ o
(||S||3) ,
(∆ct)
2 = cc˜2t + o
(||S||3)
imply that
u(Ht) = u
′(H)c
(
c˜t +
1
2
c˜2t
)
− hu′(H)c
(
c˜t−1 +
1
2
c˜2t−1
)
+ u′′(H)c2
(
1
2
c˜2t +
1
2
h2c˜2t−1 − hc˜tc˜t−1
)
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) ,
where the tilde denotes the log-deviation of a variable from its steady-state
value. Rearranging the above expression yields
u(Ht) = u
′(H)c (c˜t − hc˜t−1) + 1
2
u′(H)c
(
c˜2t − hc˜2t
)
+
1
2
u′′(H)c2 (c˜t − c˜t−1)2 + t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) .
Using the fact that
u′′(H)c
u′(H)
=
−σ(1− h)−σ−1c−σ
(1− h)−σc−σ =
−σ
1− h
one can obtain
u(Ht) = u
′(H)c
{
c˜t − hc˜t−1 + 1
2
[
c˜2t − hc˜2t−1 −
σ
1− h (c˜t − hc˜t−1)
2
]}
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) .
The discounted sum of the above expression is
∞∑
t=1
βt−1u(Ht) = (1− βh)u′(H)c
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
{
c˜t +
1
2
[
1− (1 + βh2) σ¯] c˜2t}
+ (1− βh)u′(H)c
∞∑
t=1
βt−1hc˜tc˜t−1
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) , (30)
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where
σ¯ =
σ
(1− h)(1− βh) .
Now let us consider the labor term of the social welfare function. If lt(i)
is the labor input of firm i, then aggregate labor utilization is
lt =
∫ 1
0
lt(i) di = Ei [lt(i)] .
This implies that
l˜t = Ei
[
l˜t(i)
]
+
1
2
vari
[
l˜t(i)
]
+ o
(||S||3) .
Recall equation (12),
l1−αt (i) = nt(i) = a
yt(i)
At
.
Thus, l˜t(i) = α¯n˜t(i), where α¯ = (1− α)−1. As a consequence,
l˜t = α¯Ei [n˜t(i)] +
1
2
α¯2vari [n˜t(i)] + o
(||S||3) .
As for yt, it is true for nt that
nt =
(∫ 1
0
nt(i)
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
,
which implies that
Ei [n˜t(i)] = n˜t − 1
2
θ − 1
θ
vari [n˜t(i)] + o
(||S||3) ,
thus,
l˜t = α¯n˜t +
1
2
α¯θ (1 + θαˆ) vari
[
P˜t(i)
]
+ o
(||S||3) , (31)
where αˆ = αα¯, and it is used that vari [n˜t(i)] = vari [y˜t(i)], and vari [y˜t(i)] =
θ2vari
[
P˜t(i)
]
, which is a consequence of equation (11).
Since
nt = a
yt
At
= a
ct + xt
At
=
ct
At
a
(
1 +
xt
ct
)
,
variable n˜t can be expressed as
n˜t = c˜t − A˜t − g˜t,
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where
g˜t =
x
x+ c
(c˜t − x˜t) = (1− a) (c˜t − x˜t) .
The inspection of (17) and (18) reveals that condition
η =
(1− h)(1− βh)
σ
(32)
ensures that the difference between c˜t and x˜t depends only on stochastic
shocks and initial conditions. Furthermore, formula (12), a consequence of
the Leontieff technology, and condition (32) imply that variable r˜t = A˜t + g˜t
also depends only on stochastic shocks and initial conditions. Substituting
n˜t = c˜t − r˜t into equation (31) yields
l˜t = α¯ (c˜t − r˜t) + 1
2
α¯θ (1 + θαˆ) vari
[
P˜t(i)
]
+ o
(||S||3) . (33)
The approximation of the disutility of labor of household j is given by
v(lt(j)) = v
′(l)l
{
l˜t(j) +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)l˜2t (j)
}
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) .
Aggregating this formula one obtains∫ 1
0
v(lt(j)) dj =
v′(l)l
{
Ej
[
l˜t(j)
]
+
1
2
(1 + ϕ)
[
Ej
[
l˜t(j)
]2
+ varj
[
l˜t(j)
]]}
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) .
Using equations
Ej
[
l˜t(j)
]
= l˜t − 1
2
θw − 1
θw
varj
[
l˜t(j)
]
+ o
(||S||3) ,
Ej
[
l˜t(j)
]2
= l˜2t + o
(||S||3) ,
and varj
[
l˜t(j)
]
= θ2wvarj [w˜t(j)], an implication of equation (7), yields∫ 1
0
v(lt(j)) dj = (34)
v′(l)l
{
l˜t +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)l˜2t +
1
2
θw(1 + ϕθw)varj
[
W˜t(j)
]}
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) .
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Substitute equation (33) into equation (34),∫ 1
0
v(lt(j)) dj = (35)
(1− βh)u′(H)c
2
{
2c˜t + (1 + ϕ)α¯
(
c˜2t − 2r˜tc˜t
)
+ θ (1 + αˆθ) vari
[
P˜t(i)
]}
+
(1− βh)u′(H)c
2
{
θwα¯
−1 (1 + ϕθw) varj
[
W˜t(j)
]}
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) ,
where it is used that
(1− βh)u′(H)c = α¯v′(l)l,
since equation (28) implies that
(1− βh)u′(H)c = α¯v′(l)cαˆ+1A−α¯ = α¯v′(l)
( c
A
)α¯
.
Combining equations (30) and (35) yields the following expression for the
utility function defined by equation (29):
U(Y0, S) = − J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
{[(
1 + βh2
)
σ¯ + ϕα¯+ αˆ
]
c˜2t − 2hσ¯c˜tc˜t−1
}
− J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
{
2(1 + ϕ)α¯r˜tc˜t + θ (1 + θαˆ) vari
[
P˜t(i)
]}
− J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1θwα¯−1 (1 + θwϕ) varj
[
W˜t(j)
]
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) ,
where J = (1 − βh)u′(H)c/2. For the calculation of the coefficient of term
c˜2t it was taken into account that (1 + ϕ)α¯ = 1 + ϕα¯+ αˆ.
As Woodford (2003, ch. 6) shows, the welfare analysis becomes inaccu-
rate, if the approximation of the social welfare function contains first-order
terms of endogenous variables. Condition (28), formula (12), an implication
of the Leontieff technology, and condition (32) ensure that in the objective
function there are only second-order terms of endogenous variables.
Define c˜wrt , the welfare reference level of consumption, which is deter-
mined by[(
1 + βh2
)
σ¯ + ϕα¯+ αˆ
]
c˜wrt − βhσ¯Et
[
c˜wrt+1
]− hσ¯c˜wrt−1 = (1 + ϕ)α¯r˜t.
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Using this definition one can express U(Y0, S) as
U(Y0, S) = − J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[(
1 + βh2
)
σ¯ + ϕα¯+ αˆ
] {
c˜2t − 2c˜wrt c˜t
}
(36)
− J
∞∑
t=1
βt−12hσ¯
{
c˜tc˜t−1 − c˜t
(
βc˜wrt+1 + c˜
wr
t−1
)}
− J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1θ (1 + θαˆ) vari
[
P˜t(i)
]
− J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1θwα¯−1 (1 + θwϕ) varj
[
W˜t(j)
]
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) .
The expression
−J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
{[(
1 + βh2
)
σ¯ + ϕα¯+ αˆ
]
(c˜wrt )
2 + c˜wrt c˜
wr
t−1
}
+ 2hσ¯c˜0c˜
wr
1 , (37)
depends only on the exogenous variable r˜t and initial conditions, that is,
only on terms that are independent of policy (t.i.p.). Let us define the
consumption gap,
cˆt = c˜t − c˜wrt .
Using this definition, and adding the discounted sum (37) to equation (36)
yields
U(Y0, S) = − J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
{
Acˆ2t − 2Bcˆtcˆt−1
}
(38)
− J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1θ (1 + θαˆ) vari
[
P˜t(i)
]
− J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1θwα¯−1 (1 + θwϕ) varj
[
W˜t(j)
]
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) ,
where A = (1 + βh2) σ¯ + ϕα¯+ αˆ and B = hσ¯. Define δ0 and δ in such a way
that
A = (1 + βδ2)δ0, and B = δδ0.
Then parameter δ is the solution of the following quadratic equation:
Aδ = B
(
1 + βδ2
)
.
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Let us choose the smaller root of the above equation, which satisfies 0 ≤ δ ≤
h. Equation (38) can be simplified further, since
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
(
Acˆ2t − 2Bcˆtcˆt−1
)
= δ0
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[(
1 + βδ2
)
cˆ2t − 2δcˆtcˆt−1
]
= δ0
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
(
cˆ2t − 2δcˆtcˆt−1 + δ2cˆ2t−1
)
+ δ0δ
2cˆ0
= δ0
∞∑
t=1
βt−1 (cˆt − δcˆt−1)2 + t.i.p.
Substituting the above expression into (38) yields
U(Y0, S) = − J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1δ0 (cˆt − δcˆt−1) (39)
− J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1θ (1 + θαˆ) vari
[
P˜t(i)
]
− J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1θwα¯−1 (1 + θwϕ) varj
[
W˜t(j)
]
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) .
Now it will be shown how it is possible to express the variance of prices
and wages by price and wage inflation. First, the assumptions on pricing
behavior imply that
Ei
[
P˜t(i)
]
= γEi
[
P˜t−1(i) + ϑpit−1
]
+ (1− γ)P˜ ot , (40)
Ei
[
P˜ 2t (i)
]
= γEi
[(
P˜t−1(i) + ϑpit−1
)2]
+ (1− γ)
(
P˜ ot
)2
, (41)
where P˜ ot denotes the price, which is chosen by those firms which set their
price in an optimal, forward-looking way in period t.
Let P¯t = Ei
[
P˜t(i)
]
, then by equation (40) it is easy to show that
P¯t − P¯t−1 − ϑpit−1 = (1− γ)
(
P˜ ot − P¯t−1 − ϑpit−1
)
. (42)
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Now let us express the variance of prices,
vari
[
P˜t(i)
]
= vari
[
P˜t(i)− P¯t−1 − ϑpit−1
]
= Ei
[(
P˜t(i)− P¯t−1 − ϑpit−1
)2]
− Ei
[
P˜t(i)− P¯t−1 − ϑpit−1
]2
= Ei
[(
P˜t(i)− P¯t−1 − ϑpit−1
)2]
− (P¯t − P¯t−1 − ϑpit−1)2
= γEi
[(
P˜t−1(i)− P¯t−1
)2]
+ (1− γ)
(
P˜ ot − P˜t−1 − ϑpit−1
)2
− (P¯t − P¯t−1 − ϑpit−1)2 ,
where equations (40) and (41) are used for the derivation of the last equality.
Using the above formula and equation (42) yields
vari
[
P˜t(i)
]
= γvari
[
P˜t−1(i)
]
+
γ
1− γ (P¯t − P¯t−1 − ϑpit−1)
2.
Since P¯t = P˜t + o (||S||2), one can obtain(
P¯t − P¯t−1 − ϑpit−1
)2
= (pit − ϑpit−1)2 + o
(||S||3) .
Combining the previous formulas yields the following expression for the vari-
ance of prices:
vari
[
P˜t(i)
]
= γvari
[
P˜t−1(i)
]
+
γ
1− γ (pit − ϑpit−1) + o
(||S||3) . (43)
One can show that a similar expression is true for the variance of wages, i.e.
varj
[
W˜t(j)
]
= γwvarj
[
W˜t−1(j)
]
+
γw
1− γw (pi
w
t − ϑwpit−1) + o
(||S||3) . (44)
Using equation (43) by recursive substitutions it is possible to show that
∞∑
t=1
βt−1vari
[
P˜t(i)
]
=
γ
∑∞
t=1 β
t−1
(1− γ)(1− βγ)(pit−ϑpit−1)
2+t.i.p.+o
(||S||3) . (45)
Similarly equation (44) implies that
∞∑
t=1
βt−1varj
[
W˜t(j)
]
= (46)
γw
∑∞
t=1 β
t−1
(1− γw)(1− βγw)(pi
w
t − ϑwpit−1)2 + t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) .
32
Substitute equations (45) and (46) into equation (39), and use definitions
(14) and (9), then
U(Y0, S) = −J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1δ0cˆ2t
−J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
{
θ
ξ
(pit − ϑpit−1) + α¯
−1θw
ξw
(piwt − ϑwpit−1)
}
+ t.i.p. + o
(||S||3) .
Let J = J(θ/ξ + (1 − α)θw/ξw), then the social welfare function can be
expressed as
U(Y0, S) = −J
∞∑
t=1
βt−1Lt + o
(||S||3)+ t.i.p.,
where
Lt = λccˆ
2
t + λpi(pit − ϑpit−1)2 + λw(piwt − ϑwpit−1)2,
and
λc =
δ0
θξ−1 + (1− α)θwξ−1w
, λpi =
θξ−1
θξ−1 + (1− α)θwξ−1w
,
λw =
(1− α)θwξ−1w
θξ−1 + (1− α)θwξ−1w
.
This obviously implies that maximization of the expected utility function
E1 [U(Y0, S)]
is equivalent to the minimization of the expected loss function
∞∑
t=1
βt−1E1 [Lt] .
A.3 Calculation of the optimal solution
In this model there is only one policy variable: the monetary authority deter-
mines the value of the nominal exchange rate at date t = 1, and it remains
unchanged later. Formally, this means that the depreciation rate de˜1 is a
decision variable, but de˜t = 0, for all t ≥ 2. Joining a currency union is not
simply an exchange rate peg, but it means that pegging the exchange rate
is perfectly credible, hence rational expectations imply that E1 [de˜t] = 0, for
all t ≥ 2.
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This implies that it is worthwhile treating the depreciation rate formally
as a first-order autoregressive process, with autoregressive parameter φe = 0,
and the realizations of its innovations et = 0, for all t ≥ 2. That is,
de˜t = φ
t−1
e de˜t−1 + 
e
t , E1 [de˜t] = φ
t−1
e de˜1.
Thus the exogenous variables, namely, the policy variable and the stochastic
shocks, are treated uniformly in the model.
All the stochastic shocks of the model are determined by first-order au-
toregressive processes, and it is assumed that the shocks are uncorrelated to
each other. To simplify the calculations in equation (17) c˜t−1 is replaced by
c˜t−1 =
c˜t − c∗t
φc∗
,
where φc∗ and c∗t are the corresponding autoregressive parameter and inno-
vation, respectively. The vector of the shocks is
St = [de˜t, c˜
∗
t , 
c∗
t , x˜
∗
t , P˜
F∗
t , P˜
m∗
t , A˜t, υ˜t, υ˜
w
t ]
′.
The evolution of the exogenous variables is described by process
St = ΦSt−1 + Et, (47)
where coefficient matrix Φ is diagonal.
Let us supplement the log-linearized model of equations (17) – (23) with
equation (27). This system of equations is solved by the undetermined coef-
ficients algorithm. The output of the algorithm is the set of Q, Q¯, Ω, and Ω¯
matrices, which are used to determine the paths of the endogenous variables,
Yt = QYt−1 + ΩSt, Y¯t = Q¯Yt−1 + Ω¯St, (48)
where
Yt =
[
c˜t, cˆt pit, w˜t, x˜t, q˜
d
t
]′
is the vector of the state variables, Y¯t is the vector of other endogenous
variables. It is required that the eigenvalues of matrix Q are smaller than 1
in absolute value. Using equations (47) and (48) one can show by recursive
substitutions that
E1 [Yt] = KtY0 +GtS1, (49)
where
Kt = Q
t, Gt =
t∑
n=1
Qt−nΩΦn−1.
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Let us substitute equation (49) into the objective function, given by for-
mula (24), then
−
∞∑
t=1
βt−1E1
[
λccˆ
2
t + λpi(pit − ϑpit−1)2 + λw (pit + w˜t − w˜t−1 − ϑwpit−1)2
]
.
Let us introduce some new notations:
Kηt = Kt − ηKt−1,
Gηt = Gt − ηGt−1,
where η = δ, ϑ, ϑw, 1. The row vectors of these matrices are denoted by
Kηt (i :) and G
η
t (i :), respectively. Using these notations the objective function
takes the form
−
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
{
λc
[
Kδt (2 :)Y0 +G
δ
t (2 :)S1
]2
+ λpi
[
Kϑt (3 :)Y0 +G
ϑ
t (3 :)S1
]2}
− λw
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[(
Kϑwt (3 :) +K
1
t (4 :)
)
Y0 +
(
Gϑwt (3 :) +G
1
t (4 :)
)
S1
]2
.
The first-order condition is
−1
2
∂ (
∑∞
t=1 β
t−1E1 [Lt])
∂ (de˜1)
= 0,
i.e.
0 = λc
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
Kδt (2 :)Y0 +G
δ
t (2 :)S1
]
Gδt (21)
+ λpi
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
Kϑt (3 :)Y0 +G
ϑ
t (3 :)S1
]
Gϑt (31)
+ λw
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
Kϑwt (3 :) +K
1
t (4 :)
]
Y0
[
Gϑwt (31) +G
1
t (41)
]
+ λw
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
Gϑwt (3 :) +G
1
t (4 :)
]
S1
[
Gϑwt (31) +G
1
t (41)
]
.
The second-order condition is given by the coefficient of de˜1, which is evi-
dently positive, since it is the square of an expression. Hence the objective
function is concave, thus the first-order condition provides the maximum.
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The first-order condition can be expressed alternatively as
0 =
6∑
j=1
KYj Y0(j) +
9∑
s=1
KSs S1(s),
where
KYj =
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
λcK
δ
t (2j)G
δ
t (21) + λpiK
ϑ
t (3j)G
ϑ
t (31)
]
(50)
+
∞∑
t=1
βt−1λw
[
Kϑwt (3j) +K
1
t (4j)
] [
Gϑwt (31) +G
1
t (41)
]
,
and
KSs =
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
λcG
δ
t (2j)G
δ
t (21) + λpiG
ϑ
t (3j)G
ϑ
t (31)
]
(51)
+
∞∑
t=1
βt−1λw
[
Gϑwt (3j) +G
1
t (4j)
] [
Gϑwt (31) +G
1
t (41)
]
.
The above coefficients have closed form solutions. Since the eigenvalues
of Q are different from each other, there exists a diagonal matrix M and an
invertible matrix F , such that M = FQFˆ , where Fˆ = F−1 and the diagonal
elements of M are the eigenvalues of Q, which are denoted by µk. This
implies that
Kt = FM
t−1Fˆ , Gt =
t∑
n=1
FM t−nFˆΩΦn−1.
Using this one can show that the element in the ith row and jth column of
Kt is given by
Kt(ij) =
6∑
k=1
K(ij, k)µtk, (52)
where K(ij, k) = f(ik)fˆ(kj), f(ik) and fˆ(kj) are the appropriate elements
of F and Fˆ , respectively. One can show by some calculations12 that
Gt(is) =
6∑
k=1
µtk − φts
µk − φs ω̂(ik, s), (53)
12For the calculations one has to use the fact that in this model µk 6= φs, for all k and
s.
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where φs is sth diagonal element of matrix Φ,
ω̂(ik, s) =
6∑
l=1
ω(ls)K(il, k),
and ω(ls) is the element in the lth row and sth column of matrix Ω.
Using equations (52) and (53) yields
Kηt (ij) =
6∑
k=1
K(ij, k)κkηµ
t−1
k ,
Gηt (is) =
6∑
k=1
ω̂(ik, s)
κkηµ
t−1
k − ψsηφt−1s
µk − φs ,
where κkη = µk − η, ψsη = φs − η. Substituting the above expressions into
equations (50) and (51) and using the fact that φ1 = 0 one can obtain
KYj =
6∑
k=1
6∑
l=1
K̂Yj (kl),
where
K̂Yj (kl) = λcK(2j, k)κkδ
ω̂(2l, 1)
µl
(
κlδ
1− βµkµl + δ
)
+ λpiK(3j, k)κ
k
ϑ
ω̂(3l, 1)
µl
(
κlϑ
1− βµkµl + ϑ
)
+ λw
(
K(3j, k)κkϑw +K(4j, k)κ
k
1
) ω̂(3l, 1)
µl
(
κlϑw
1− βµkµl + ϑw
)
+ λw
(
K(3j, k)κkϑw +K(4j, k)κ
k
1
) ω̂(4l, 1)
µl
(
κl1
1− βµkµl + 1
)
,
and
KSs =
6∑
k=1
6∑
l=1
K̂Ss (kl),
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where
K̂Ss (kl) =
λc
ω̂(2l, 1)ω̂(2k, s)
(µk − φs)µl
[
κlδ
(
κlδ
1− βµkµl + δ
)
− ψsδ
(
κlδ
1− βµlφs + δ
)]
+λpi
ω̂(3l, 1)ω̂(3k, s)
(µk − φs)µl
[
κlϑ
(
κlϑ
1− βµkµl + ϑ
)
− ψsϑ
(
κlϑ
1− βµlφs + ϑ
)]
+λw
ω̂(3l, 1)ω̂(3k, s)
(µk − φs)µl
(
ω̂(3k, s)κkϑw + ω̂(4k, s)κ
k
1
)( κlϑ
1− βµkµl + ϑw
)
−λw ω̂(3l, 1)ω̂(3k, s)
(µk − φs)µl
(
ω̂(3k, s)ψsϑw + ω̂(4k, s)ψ
s
1
)( κlϑ
1− βφsµl + ϑw
)
+λw
ω̂(4l, 1)ω̂(3k, s)
(µk − φs)µl
(
ω̂(3k, s)κkϑw + ω̂(4k, s)κ
k
1
)( κlϑ
1− βµkµl + 1
)
−λw ω̂(4l, 1)ω̂(3k, s)
(µk − φs)µl
(
ω̂(3k, s)ψsϑw + ω̂(4k, s)ψ
s
1
)( κlϑ
1− βφsµl + 1
)
.
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Figure 1 
 
1 per cent initial deviation of the rate of inflation (π) 
Small persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Large persistence of inflation 
 
 
Units on a horizontal axis represent quarters, on a vertical axis percentage points. 
Inflationary variables are displayed in annualized terms. 
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Figure 2 
 
1 per cent initial deviation of consumption (c) 
Small persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Large persistence of inflation 
 
 
Units on a horizontal axis represent quarters, on a vertical axis percentage points. 
Inflationary variables are displayed in annualized terms. 
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Figure 3 
 
1 per cent initial deviation of the real wage (w) 
Small persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Large persistence of inflation 
 
 
Units on a horizontal axis represent quarters, on a vertical axis percentage points. 
Inflationary variables are displayed in annualized terms. 
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Figure 4 
 
1 per cent initial devaluation (de) 
Small persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Large persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Units on a horizontal axis represent quarters, on a vertical axis percentage points. 
Inflationary variables are displayed in annualized terms. 
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Figure 5 
 
1 per cent foreign-business-cycle (c*) shock 
Small persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Large persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Units on a horizontal axis represent quarters, on a vertical axis percentage points. 
Inflationary variables are displayed in annualized terms. 
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Figure 6 
 
0.08 per cent price (υ) shock 
Small persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Large persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Units on a horizontal axis represent quarters, on a vertical axis percentage points. 
Inflationary variables are displayed in annualized terms. 
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Figure 7 
 
0.06 per cent nominal-wage (υw) shock 
Small persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Large persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Units on a horizontal axis represent quarters, on a vertical axis percentage points. 
Inflationary variables are displayed in annualized terms. 
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Figure 8 
 
1 per cent productivity (A) shock 
Small persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Large persistence of inflation 
 
 
 
Units on a horizontal axis represent quarters, on a vertical axis percentage points. 
Inflationary variables are displayed in annualized terms. 
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